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Promises may undo Musharraf

B. Raman

THE US authorities seem to be increasingly focussing, inter alia, on the likely involvement of Osama bin Laden in the terrorist incidents in the US on September 11, which President George Bush has described as the beginning of the first war of the new mi llennium.

Gen Pervez Musharraf has publicly assured his ``unstinted co-operation'' against international terrorism. Mr Bush told the media on September 13 that the US ``has given Pakistan a chance to co-operate'', thereby indicating some scepticism in his mind whe ther the military junta would and, if so, to what extent.

On the basis of the present evidence, unless there has been a miraculous change in Gen Musharraf's real attitude, his co-operation would, most probably, be more pro-forma than real, for the following reasons:

*The strong personal and professional links between Gen Musharraf and Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, his Corps Commander at Lahore, on the one side, and Osama bin Laden, on the other. These bonds date from the Afghan war of the 1980s.

*The equally strong bonds of these officers with the Taliban, which was created in Ms Benazir Bhutto's second tenure. These two officers, who were then posted as Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), and Deputy Director-General of the Inter-Ser vices Intelligence (ISI) respectively, created the Taliban at the instance of Major-General (retd) Nasirullah Baber, her Interior Minister, who was himself the head of the Afghan Division of the ISI under her father.

*The way the two frustrated the efforts of Mr Nawaz Sharif, after his return from Washington in July, 1999, to co-operate with the US on the Osama bin Laden issue.

*The fears entertained by them and by fundamentalist sections of the Army and Islamic organisations in Pakistan that the end of the Osama bin Laden's set-up and the Taliban could mark the beginning of the end of the so-called jehad in Jammu and Kashmir.

*Fears of an Islamic fundamentalist backlash against him if he is perceived as co-operating with the US against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

*Ever since his appointment as the COAS in October 1998, Gen Musharraf has been proclaiming himself as strongly against international terrorism, but he has repeatedly excluded from this the terrorist activities of the so-called jehadis in J&K, the Taliba n and Osama bin Laden's set-up. He has never condemned or criticised, however mildly, the terrorist activities of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's set-up by name.

In this connection, it is necessary to recall what the Nation (January 8, 1999) reported quoting Western (apparently US) diplomatic sources in Islamabad: ``The world continues to believe that Pakistan is backing the Taliban totally and some of its instit utions also have links with Osama. The support continues through linkages established over the years. We believe that this support is much more than moral and diplomatic. It is also material and financial.

``While we believe the Nawaz Government's assurances that it has nothing to do with Osama, we suspect that part of the Pakistani establishment is involved with the man. The Prime Minister and his confidants have done much to clear suspicions that they ar e backing Osama. Many responsible Federal Ministers have assured us in private that Pakistan will never be a party to his activities and that it condemns terrorism.

``But, at the same time, they also tell us that there are wheels within wheels which they cannot stop and which continue to have truck with Osama besides rendering valuable material support to the Taliban.

``There is a vast network in your (Pakistani) intelligence community which does not listen to any Government and which operates on its own. It is definitely happening in the case of the Taliban and Osama as well. We know it.''

This position continues to be as valid today as it was in January 1999. Gen Musharraf and his coterie constituted this wheel within wheels under Mr Nawaz Sharif and continue to maintain their networking with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front has 12 organisations, with their own separate objectives. His own Al Qaeda fights for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and for the withdrawal of US and British troops from Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian groups want Islamic rule in their country. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiba want the merger of J&K with Pakistan and, subsequently, the ``liberation'' of the Muslims in other parts of India. The Sipah-e-Sahaba wants a Sunni state in Pakistan an d the declaration of the Shias as non-Muslims. The Uzbek group wants an Islamic state and the Turkistan group wants an Islamic Federation of all the Central Asian Republics and Xinjiang. The Uighurs want independence. The Abu Sayyaf wants an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. The Taliban is for an Islamic Caliphate.

The members of the Front help each other in their operations and look upon the US and Israel as their common enemies.

The proposed global counter-offensive against International Islamic Terrorism has to recognise the following ground realities:

*It will not be a one-shot war of limited duration, over after a few spectacular air strikes and commando actions. The International Islamic Front has its presence in at least 20 countries. Only about 10 per cent of its hard core is in Afghanistan. The r est are spread all over the world. They would, therefore, be in a position to retaliate in the most unexpected places in the most unpredictable manner.

*Those who join the counter-offensive should show grit and consistency in carrying it through till final victory instead of developing cold feet when faced with huge casualties and infrastructure damage in their respective countries at the hands of the t errorists.

*Any unfortunate perception among the world's Muslims that the counter-offensive is anti-Islam and not anti-international Islamic terrorism would be counter-productive.

The counter-offensive plan should, therefore, have the following components:

*A community of the intelligence agencies of the countries joining this counter-offensive for joint intelligence collection, sharing, analysis and operations.

*Mutual co-operation and assistance in strengthening the physical security of vital/sensitive infrastructure, air travel etc.

*Political, economic and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, the Taliban government and any other country assisting international Islamic terrorism, for whatever reason.

*Carefully worked out and precisely-targeted deniable covert actions against the terrorist groups and their leaders. One should avoid spectacular overt actions against them, which would be counter-productive. Public pressure for spectacular reprisals sho uld be resisted.

In the 1950s and the 1960s, when a large number of democracies in the Western and the non-aligned worlds were faced with armed Communist insurgencies sponsored by Moscow and Beijing, all the affected countries fought this menace jointly through a mix of overt and covert actions in a discreet, non-spectacular manner. That is the model to be emulated, updating it where necessary.

(The author is former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)