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Kashmir and Indo-Pak talks -- Case for a people's referendum

H. Kaushal

THE Musharraf-Vajpayee talks are due to take place in a few weeks time, and the new Pakistani President is doing his homework well. Not only has he held a conference of the corps commanders, he has also generated a debate throughout the country about the talks. Political leaders are reported to be keen on being consulted.

The former Pakistani Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, may question the applicability of the decisions arrived at by a non-elected government with India, but the General has been trying to feel the pulse of the people in real earnest. He has had little problem about snubbing the irrational, religious, Jihad fundamentalist groups spreading anti-India propaganda and influencing people. Even the Hurriyat has chosen to hold its peace in spite of provocations caused by a bomb blast at a place of worship. Th e Pakistani administration could have a hand in restraining negative forces. Gen Musharraf's strength would lie in the fact that his team would be fully prepared when they arrive in India.

There is little doubt that the Ministry of External Affairs is also preparing for this apex meeting. The merits and de-merits of different alternatives will be worked out. Publicly, the Government of India has done the following:

* Mr Jaswant Sigh and Mr L. K. Advani visited Kashmir to assess the ground situation.

* The K. C. Pant negotiations have been kept alive and Mr Pant has quietly managed to bring out that Ladakh is overwhelmingly keen on an identity separate from that of Kashmir under the Indian Union.

* The External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh, made a statement re-emphasising India's position that the whole of Kashmir is an integral part of India.

* The Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, praised the Pakistan CEO for generating a good climate for the talks by attacking the organisations spreading anti-India propaganda.

Indian intelligentsia and the media have been too pre-occupied with the unfortunate developments in Nepal to be able to comprehensively focus on Kashmir and the Indo-Pak talks. Initially, there were some articles in the press and a few panel discussions on the electronic media, but these were few, and the country appears to be in ``it is of little consequence'' mode. A government, merely because it is formed by elected representatives, does not get to know the minds of the people. A democratic approach for understanding the people on this issue would be to hold a referendum. Is the Government willing to hold such a referendum about Kashmir? There may be surprises for the government if people's opinion is sought on this subject.

There are many facets of the Indo-Pak discussions, specially on Kashmir. A few basic issues are discussed below:

Kashmir, an integral part of India

Kashmir's accession to India is legally complete and valid. Not only the Maharaja of Kashmir, but Sheik Abdullah -- the representative of the people -- ratified this accession. It was perhaps naive to approach the UN with a request to direct Pakistan to cease its aggression. Mr Jaswant Singh's statement re-stating that the entire J&K is an integral part of India and that the Government is not empowered to give away any portion of that State without the approval of Parliament, creates the most important doubt.

If all of J&K is an integral part of India and the Government is not willing to negotiate, what is to be done about the portion of Kashmir held by Pakistan and even China? Does the Government expect to persuade the General to hand over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to India? The answer would be in the negative. Even if one were to ignore the forthcoming talks, the question of accession cannot be wished away.

Speeches in Parliament and at press conferences do not provide solutions. In the best circumstances, the only option for India would be to acquire Pak-occupied Kashmir militarily. Military accession has two aspects.

The question of ``Can India militarily get Pakistan to vacate aggression in J&K?'' would normally have got a positive response a few years ago. The position has dramatically changed with both the countries acquiring nuclear weapon state status. India not crossing the LoC during the Kargil operations, and earlier in pursuit of the terrorists, could be due to the apprehension of the conflict escalating into a nuclear war. Militarily, India can get Pakistani aggression vacated in J&K, but the cost may beco me prohibitive in terms of loss of lives if nuclear weapons are brought in.

Second, can the country with-stand international pressure against military action? Perhaps not, especially as the fear of a nuclear flashpoint being reached is real. Nuclearisation is, thus, the most important single factor that has eliminated the possib ility of India acquiring the whole of J&K. Hence, India getting back the entire Valley is a myth. This will continue to arouse emotions without much practical use.

Can India administer J&K peacefully?

J&K was fairly well-governed in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Indian Government did a lot for the region's economic development. That, however, belongs to the past. Administering J&K peacefully is becoming progressively more difficult. Pakistan, through fear and religious sentiments, has been able to foment unrest. It would be foolish to harp upon India being a secular state, having more Muslims than Pakistan. There have been increasing reports of terrorist-related deaths in Kashmir. Similar reports ab out Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have found little mention in the media. Does it signify that the Indian administration has not been as successful as the Pakistani administration in Kashmir? Or does it mean that secularism has not achieved the desired resul t in Kashmir?

Indian secularism

India's neighbour, Nepal, is the only Hindu nation in the world with Muslims, Buddhists and some Christians living in peace and harmony. There have been no religious riots in Hindu Nepal, while in secular India, there are regular religious disturbances. Hindus live in Pakistan, Bangladesh and even Afghanistan, though none of these countries profess secularism. These are Muslim states. There is need to evaluate the merits and demerits of Indian secularism based on the following:

* Have Indian minority communities felt more secure and happy merely because India is a secular state? Would an Indian belonging to a minority community feel less loyal to the country if India became a Hindu state? It will be difficult for most ardent su pporters of secularism to ignore the fact that there are black-sheep in India whose sympathies lie with Pakistan.

Crackers are often or sweets distributed when Pakistan defeats India in a hockey or a cricket match. Should such `loyalties' be curbed? This does not mean, even remotely, that the patriotism and integrity of all members of the minority community are in d oubt. But if secularism means protecting the action of individuals with cross-border sympathies, the country must re-evaluate the need for secularism.

* Indian secularism has achieved marginal success in Kashmir. Would the situation have been different if India was a Hindu state and the administration tougher on terrorism? Administration could be lot more professionally tougher if it did not have to ca rry the restrains of secularism.

* Though there is a religious affinity between Nepal and India, India continues to be suspect. The recent tragedy in Nepal has brought out the fear and apprehension of the Indian community in that country. Would a Hindu India and Hindu Nepal have been cl oser? Would Pakistan ISI activities decreased in Nepal. If the two countries were united through the bond of being Hindu states?

All countries have religious minorities, but no government tom-toms its secularism as India does. And yet Indian secularism has brought doubtful gains, while being a Hindu state could possibly have got some benefits.

* There is no doubt that Pakistan has been bleeding -- physically and economically -- due to its actions against India, especially in Kashmir. But the ISI continues to successfully conduct terrorist actions. Neither the Indian ceasefire nor the threat of ``No talks till cross-border terrorism persists'' has had any effect. Gen Musharraf cannot be faulted if he concludes that the Indian government has had to climb down and invite him; an invitation he has been asking for. The Pakistani team will, thus, c ome to the negotiating table well-prepared for talks, from a position of strength.

* There could be little doubt about the position of the Jammu and Ladakh regions. Both have repeatedly cried for complete integration with India. The country should consider separating the Valley from these two regions and abolish the Article on special status for these regions. Kashmir could retain the special status. This move would require:

a) Development of surface communications with Ladakh and Leh without necessarily having to go to Srinagar.

b) Acceptance of the deduction that the position of Kashmir region is different from that of the other two regions. This would have an advantage of narrowing down the area of conflict.

There are obviously many other views about the forthcoming talks and Kashmir. Many of these may be better than those discussed above. There is, nevertheless, a need to address the issues publicly, rather than hiding behind well-known, oft-repeated cliche s. Dialogue is naturally better, but let there be an exposure to what can be achieved and how?

(The author is a Pune-based freelance writer. The author is a former Group Captain, Indian Air Force.)