The Hindu Business Line : Much heat, little light on nuclear deal

While New Delhi can say it is not bound by any "Sense of the Congress" provisions in the legislation, it must recognise that nuclear cooperation with the US will end if it tests a `nuclear device'. Therefore there is merit in the criticism that India is being coerced to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by threats of sanctions and an end to nuclear cooperation, says G. PARTHASARATHY. India should not rush into concluding any agreement for importing nuclear reactors till there are irrevocable guarantees of fuel supply for the life of the reactors.

The Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, and the US President, Mr George W. Bush, signed an agreement on July 18, 2005, under which Mr Bush pledged he would work to achieve "full nuclear energy cooperation" with India. He also pledged to secure the US Congress' agreement to amend laws to end nuclear sanctions against India and to work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable the resumption of nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.

What the deal essentially aimed at was an end to nuclear sanctions, not merely by the US, but by the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which includes the US, Russia, China, France, the UK and Canada. These sanctions had sullied India's international image and halted all trade and cooperation in nuclear-related fields with these countries for three decades. Russia and France had indicated that they would be in a position to end nuclear-related sanctions only if the US took the lead.

In response to the pledge of Mr Bush, Dr Manmohan Singh agreed to separate India's peaceful and strategic nuclear facilities and sign an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency for placing all peaceful nuclear facilities under international safeguards. One of the architects of our nuclear weapons programme, Dr Raja Ramanna, had favoured such an approach. Dr Manmohan Singh reiterated India's commitment to the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing made by the NDA Government. He also agreed to "working with the US for the conclusion of a Multilateral Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT)."

A SELL-OUT

The July 18 Agreement was described as a "sell-out" by influential quarters in both the US and India. The non-proliferation hardliners in the US launched a shrill campaign that the nuclear deal would compromise American commitments to global nuclear non-proliferation, encourage countries such as North Korea and Iran to go nuclear and destabilise the balance of power in Asia, as it would permit India to develop hundreds of nuclear warheads by getting access to imported uranium ore for its power reactors.

In India, apart from criticism by the BJP and Communist parties, there was genuine concern that the deal would compel us to eschew nuclear testing for our nuclear weapons production, and also "cap" it at a relatively low level. There was also concern that the US would use the deal to pressure us on foreign policy issues such as Iran.

The operative parts of the proposed legislation to end US sanctions on India that won the approval of the House of Representatives on Wednesday and has secured considerable support in the Senate broadly conform to the provisions of the July 18 Agreement. But the proposed legislation contains several "non-binding" clauses that cause understandable concern.

There are demands that India should join the US effort to "dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran" for its efforts to "acquire weapons of mass destruction". These provisions also require Mr Bush to work to obtain a "moratorium on fissile material production by India, Pakistan and China" and conclude an FMCT at the earliest, to which India and US become parties.

Finally, there is a legally binding provision that nuclear cooperation with India will end if it tests a nuclear device. What is even more objectionable is that this provision is designed to prevent India from even undertaking sub-critical (hydro-nuclear) tests to determine the reliability of its nuclear weapons.

While New Delhi can say it is not bound by any "Sense of the Congress" provisions in the legislation, it cannot ignore the fact that, as things stand, nuclear cooperation with the US will end if it tests a `nuclear device". There is, therefore, merit in the criticism that India is being coerced to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the threats of sanctions and an end to nuclear cooperation.

`CORRECTIVE MEASURES'

In his statement to Parliament on March 7, Dr Manmohan Singh asserted that the India-specific safeguards negotiated between India and the IAEA would permit India to take "corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of future foreign supplies". He also said: "The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors."

He added: "If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries such as Russia, France and the UK to pursue measures as would restore supplies to India."

India has yet to negotiate the text of a bilateral nuclear energy agreement with the US and an Additional Protocol for safeguards with the IAEA. The NSG is also yet to approve the end of nuclear sanctions against India. It remains to be seen what conditions some members of the NSG will seek to impose for a resumption of nuclear cooperation.

No government in India can allow a situation to arise where fuel supplies for nuclear power plants are terminated if India decides that its national security interests require that it has to carry out further nuclear tests. The main focus of national attention has to be on whether fuel supply agreements we sign contain irrevocable provisions for uninterrupted fuel supplies and a "strategic reserve of nuclear fuel".

CONDITIONS FOR FMCT

The July 18 Agreement states that India will "work with the US for the conclusion of a FMCT". It does not, however, require us to accede prematurely to such a treaty that will cap our nuclear weapons programme. We have agreed to complete separation of some designated peaceful facilities and weapons related nuclear facilities only by 2014. It is evident from this separation plan that we intend to produce fissile material for weapons even beyond 2014.

Thus, while we need not oppose the conclusion of a FMCT, we should make it clear that we will abide by its provisions only if it is verifiable, non-discriminatory and not binding on us till we choose to accede to it.

India should not rush into concluding any agreement for importing nuclear reactors till there are irrevocable guarantees of fuel supply for the life of the reactors. Nuclear power from imported reactors can perhaps generate 30,000 MW in coming decades. Nepal alone, however, has the potential for providing 83,000 MW of hydro-electric power.

Secondly, we seem to have lost a sense of direction, will and courage to develop a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent. This deterrent is now less than minimal and certainly not credible, given the delays in testing and deploying the Agni 3 missile and the absence of sea-launch capabilities.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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