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G. Parthasarathy

Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan... all represent the difficult challenges facing the US diplomacy in the world today, according to a recent report by a Task Force co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society in New York. G. P arthasarathy surveys the situation, especially in Afghanistan, and Pakistan vis-à-vis India.

UNLIKE in India, the United States Government often facilitates and invariably takes note of studies by prestigious institutions on crucial national security and foreign policy issues. New Delhi would be well advised to study a recent report titled New Priorities in South Asia by a "Task Force" co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society in New York.

The Task Force describes India as a country with "political stability" which has "a decade of steady economic advance and the potential for long-term political and strategic partnership and substantially expanded trade and economic relations with the United States".

It observes that as Indian and American interests "broadly coincide", the US should treat India as a "friendly country" and lift its current restrictions on sensitive "dual use" technologies that have both civilian and military applications. While this report will reinforce the arguments of those within the Bush Administration who favour a long-term strategic partnership with New Delhi, it would be unwise to expect that such policy changes will inevitably occur. The non-proliferation warriors within and outside the State Department will resist and stall moves that seek change.

The Task Force has found that "Pakistan presents one of the most complex and difficult challenges facing US diplomacy anywhere in the world today. Its political instability, entrenched Islamist extremism, economic and social weaknesses, and dangerous confrontation with India have cast dark shadows over the nuclear-armed nation. Even though Pakistan offers valuable help in rooting out Al Qaeda remnants, it has failed to prevent Islamist terrorists from using its territory as a base for armed attacks on Kashmir and Afghanistan."

The report recommends that Pakistan should be provided economic and security assistance as American interests require "a stable Pakistan at peace with its neighbours". It suggests that aid to Pakistan should be carefully calibrated so that above a certain level ($300 million annually), it should be disbursed only if Pakistan acts to implement political and economic reforms, ends support for insurgencies against its neighbours and fulfils its non-proliferation responsibilities.

This is the first instance when an influential body in the US has not only acknowledged that Pakistan is supporting insurgencies in neighbouring countries, but also recommended a policy of "carrot and stick" in dealing with Pakistan, unlike the "all carrot and no stick" approach of the US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell, and his State Department mandarins.

It would be difficult to take exception to the spirit behind the recommendations of the Joint Council for Foreign Relations/Asia Society Task Force that included distinguished and knowledgeable persons such as Ambassadors Frank Wisner and Denis Kux. The report is, however, remarkably silent on whether the military establishment in Pakistan that has dominated both the domestic politics and foreign policy and national security thinking in that country, can be persuaded to give up its cherished beliefs like "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, or "bleeding India with a thousand cuts" in Kashmir, merely by reducing aid by a few hundred million dollars annually.

While the US may have its own compulsions for changing its assessments about the Pakistani strongman, Gen Pervez Musharraf, who was regarded as a "hardliner" on India by the Clinton White House, this is not a luxury that India can afford, till Gen Musharraf demonstrates that Islamabad is irrevocably moving away from its use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Thus, while one can have no quarrels with the motivations behind the Task Force recommendations, the time has perhaps come for India to engage the US more intensely on the pernicious role, both domestically and internationally, of the military establishment in Pakistan.

It is obviously going to take time for the realities of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan to sink into the minds of the mandarins in the State Department. There are reports from eminent Pakistani writers like Ahmed Rashid, about how Quetta has become the epicentre of the Taliban leadership and its cadres. More ominously, observers from within Pakistan have noted how both the Bush Administration and the Musharraf dispensation speak only of their cooperation in dealing with the Al Qaeda, with hardly any reference to collaboration to seek out and eliminate Taliban leaders.

After all, not a single senior Taliban leader has been arrested or killed by American or Pakistani forces in the past year, despite assertions by the Afghan President, Mr Hamid Karzai, and members of his Government about the assistance being provided to the Taliban on Pakistani soil. The former Taliban military leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is known to have been in regular touch with the ISI, evidently to broker a deal between the Americans and so-called "moderate" elements in the Taliban.

The situation on the ground on Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan is steadily deteriorating. Attacks on Afghan Government military establishments have been increasing.

The Taliban and Pakistanis also know that after their experiences in battles in Tora Bora and Shahikot and in Iraq, American forces in Afghanistan have no stomach for operations that could involve casualties on their side. The Taliban is now firmly ensconced in the four border districts of Paktika, Paktia, Kunar and Nangarhar and is preparing to strike at urban centres such as Kandahar, Khost and Jalalabad.

A recent report indicates that even as Pakistani troops were said to be engaged in tackling the Taliban and Al Qaeda, a former Minister in the Taliban Government, Mullah Jalil, was merrily travelling all around Pakistan, including Karachi, collecting funds for the jehad against foreign troops in Afghanistan. Gen Musharraf evidently feels that by next summer he can create conditions in Afghanistan for Gen Powell to start talking about including "Moderate Taliban" in the Karzai Government and marginalising the Northern Alliance.

And given the praise that Gen Powell and the Assistant Secretary of State, Ms Christina Rocca, heap on him, Gen Musharraf can also step up infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir once the winter snows melt in May 2004, with little worry about any adverse consequences. These are challenges that we should even now prepare to face. They call for closer consultations with like-minded countries such as Russia and Iran.

Speaking recently to armed forces commanders in New Delhi, the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, acknowledged that his efforts for peace and reconciliation with Pakistan can at best influence those elements in Pakistan that recognise the follies of following policies of compulsive hostility towards India.

Mercifully, wishful thinking that led to us inviting Gen Musharraf to Agra is now a thing of the past. The US National Security Adviser, Ms Condoleezza Rice, recently expressed her admiration for the confidence-building measures proposed by India, indicating that the process to normalise relations with Pakistan is going to be a long and difficult one.

The Task Force recommendations are also realistic and speak of efforts to "manage," rather than "resolve," differences between India and Pakistan. Gen Musharraf, however, constantly harps on a "result oriented" and "meaningful" dialogue, suggesting that there can be no progress in building confidence, or otherwise normalising relations with India till such time as the Kashmir issue is resolved to his satisfaction. New Delhi will, therefore, have to devise imaginative ways to proceed with a process of engagement with Pakistan that enhances people-to-people contacts, promotes confidence and increases trade and economic cooperation bilaterally and regionally. At the same time, relentless military and diplomatic pressure will have to be mounted on the Musharraf dispensation to raise the costs it must pay for its present policies.

(The author is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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